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George published The Condition of Labor, a critical response to Rerum Novarum. It has been generally
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The Pope and Henry George: Pope Leo XIII compared with Henry George, on the
ownership of land and other natural resources. A possible rapprochement?
John Pullen
I.

Introduction

In May 1891, Pope Leo XIII issued the encyclical letter, Rerum Novarum,1 also known as
The Condition of Labour, in which he set down Catholic social teaching on contemporary
social and political problems, such as the relationship between labour and capital, the level of
wages and profits, unemployment, strikes and lockouts, the role of the state, cooperative
societies, social justice, and of particular concern in this article, the ethical justification of
private property, in response to mounting movements away from capitalism toward socialism
and communism. Later in 1891, the American economist and social reformer, Henry George,
replied to Leo’s encyclical in a book entitled The Condition of Labour. An Open Letter to
Pope Leo XIII.2
George’s Progress and Poverty3 was being widely circulated at the time. Famous for
his oratory as well as his radical ideas, George was attracting immense audiences to his
public lectures in America, Britain and Australia. He was under the impression that the
encyclical was intended, at least in part, as a reply to his own ideas, although that
interpretation has been disputed. The purpose of this article is to discuss what is probably the
major theme, and the most controversial theme, of George’s reply, namely, his comments on
and criticisms of Leo’s views on the ethical justification for private property in general, and
in particular for private ownership of land and other natural resources.
The article begins (Section II) with a brief biographical note on George’s personal
attitude toward Leo and the Catholic Church. It includes passages from previously
unpublished letters of George referring to his religious convictions. Section III considers the
disputed question of whether Leo’s intention in the encyclical was to refute George. The
article continues with an exposition of Leo’s arguments (Section IV) for, and George’s
arguments (Section V) against, private ownership of land. Sections VI-X deal with particular
issues in their controversy. Section XI (Conclusion) discusses the feasibility of a
reconciliation of the views of Leo and George on the ownership of land and other natural
resources, and the possibility of some degree of rapprochement.
The issues that concerned Leo XIII and Henry George in 1891 are of more than
antiquarian interest. The ownership and distribution of land and other natural resources
continue to be discussed in later encyclicals, such as Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno,
1931;4 Pope John Paul II, Laborem Exercens, 1981,5 and Centesimus Annus, 1991;6 Pope
Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, 2009;7 and Pope Francis, Laudato Si, 2015,8 and remain
matters of universal human concern at social and economic, as well as theological levels.

Pope Leo XIII, “The Condition of Labour (Rerum Novarum). Encyclical Letter of Pope Leo XIII”, in H.
George, The Land Question (New York: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1953).
2
In H. George, The Land Question (New York: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1953).
3
New York: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, [1879] 1956.
4
Encyclical letter. Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1931.
5
Encyclical letter. Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1981.
6
Encyclical letter. Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1991.
7
Encyclical letter. Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2009.
8
Encyclical letter. Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2015.
1

Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2019

1

Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 2

II.

George’s personal attitude toward Leo and the Catholic Church.

Although George forcibly opposed Leo’s views on the ownership of land, he appears to have
had no personal animosity toward the Pope or toward the Catholic Church: ‘for your office I
have profound respect, for yourself personally the highest esteem’,9 and for ‘your personal
character’ and ‘your exalted office’.10 In criticising Leo’s views, he did not wish ‘to be
understood as in the slightest degree questioning either your sincerity or intelligence in
adopting them’.11 He said he had ‘written frankly’, and ‘I trust I have done so without
offense’.12
Despite the warmth of these expressions of appreciation of Leo as a person and of the
position he held, George did not mince words in expressing disagreement. For example, he
said Leo had ‘unfortunately overlooked’13 certain considerations, and accused Leo of ‘one
fatal assumption, namely that he failed to see the real cause of the evils’.14 Even more
forcibly, he said to Leo: you are ‘blinded by one false assumption, you do not see even
fundamentals’,15 and he described Leo’s views on this matter as ‘erroneous and dangerous’.16
George’s writings, speeches and letters are replete with references to God and
spiritual matters, and show that in his personal life he was a very religious person. He was
brought up in the Evangelical denomination of Christianity, and later converted to
Methodism. His wife was a Catholic, following in the religion of her Irish mother, and his
wife’s sister became a Catholic nun. He had a number of friends and supporters among the
Catholic clergy - in particular, Father Thomas Dawson in Ireland. In a long letter in February
1883 to Father Dawson, George set out his position: ‘Don’t be disturbed because I am not a
Catholic. In some things your Church is very attractive to me; in others it is repellent…
Believe this, my dear Father, that if it be God’s will that I should be a Catholic He will call
me to it.’17 In a letter on 23 October 1882 to Father Dawson, George wrote: ‘I, too, am
extremely anxious to get the support of the Catholic Church’18, but he clearly had no
intention of relinquishing his opposition to private ownership of land. In a letter to Father
Dawson on 9 December 1888, he said: ‘the condemnation of slavery by the Pope is very
suggestive. Sometime – after the fight is over – we shall have a Pope condemning private
property in land. We shall not be here; but I have faith we shall be somewhere.’19
III.

Intention of the encyclical.

There has been some discussion in the secondary literature20 about whether the intention of
Leo, or one of his intentions, in issuing the encyclical was specifically to refute George’s
George, “The Condition of Labour”, 101.
Ibid., 105.
11
Ibid., 101.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid., 68-70.
15
Ibid., 81.
16
Ibid., 101.
17
Henry George, Henry George to Father Thomas Dawson, February 1883. Letter. Manuscripts and Archives
Division, The New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox, and Tilden Foundations. I am grateful for permission
granted by the New York Public Library to quote from this and other letters mentioned below.
18
Henry George, Henry George to Father Thomas Dawson, 23 October 1882. Letter. Manuscripts and Archives
Division, The New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox, and Tilden Foundations.
19
Henry George, Henry George to Father Thomas Dawson, 9 December 1888. Letter. Manuscripts and
Archives Division, The New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox, and Tilden Foundations.
20
For example: ‘In George's open letter to Leo on Rerum Novarum he seemed intuitively to understand that the
encyclical was a veiled criticism of his philosophy and of what came to be known as the “Single Tax”’ (B.
9

10
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view as presented in his Progress and Poverty and his other writings on this topic. George
was clearly under the impression that the encyclical was motivated by a desire to refute his
views. But a large part of the encyclical was not relevant to George’s writings, and was not
referred to by George in his reply. There is no direct reference to George in the encyclical,
but an indirect reference can be seen in the following passage, described by the encyclical as
being among ‘certain obsolete opinions’: ‘We are told that it is right for private persons to
have the use of the soil and the fruits of their land, but that it is unjust for anyone to possess
as owner either the land on which he has built or the estate which he has cultivated’.21
Whether or not Leo’s Condition of Labour was intended as a reply to George’s
Progress and Poverty, there is no doubt that George’s Condition of Labour was intended as a
reply to Leo’s Condition of Labour. However, the purpose of this article is not to enter into
the discussion of whether the encyclical was intended as a response to George. Its purpose is
merely to analyse the arguments of Leo and George irrespective of whether the former were
directed at the latter.
IV.

Leo’s arguments for private ownership of land.

Leo’s encyclical presents a vigorous justification of private ownership: ‘For every man has
by nature the right to possess property as his own’.22 The right of private ownership was not
restricted by Leo to human products, but extended to land23 and other natural resources:
‘Hence man not only can possess the fruits of the earth, but also the earth itself’.24 Leo argued
that the right to Earth is a universal right, not a right limited to only a portion of the human
race: ‘For God has granted the earth to mankind in general’ for the use and enjoyment of the
universal human race’.25
But Leo also argued that this general or universal right of everyone to Earth is
consistent with the right of individuals to particular portions of Earth as their private
property: ‘to say that God has given the earth to the use and enjoyment of the universal
human race is not to deny that there can be private property’;26 the right of property belongs
‘to individual persons’,27 and although there is a general right for everyone to use Earth,
Hennigan, “Just Reward: the Nature of Work and its Remuneration in the Economics and Ethics of Henry
George”, American Journal of Economics and Sociology 71, no. 9 (2012): 866). See also C.J. Nuesse, “Henry
George and Rerum Novarum”, American Journal of Economics and Sociology 44, no. 2 (1985): 241-254. The
policy of a Single Tax, based on land values, was a prominent feature of George's proposal, but was not
addressed explicitly in Leo's encyclical, either to agree or disagree. In parts of George’s writings – for example,
in the reported speeches of his extensive Australian lecture tour in 1890 (see J. Pullen, Nature’s Gifts. The
Australian Lectures of Henry George on the Ownership of Land & Other Natural Resources, Leichhardt, NSW:
Desert Pea Press, 2014) – he appears to have deviated from strict or absolute reliance on the singleness of landvalue tax, but if a Single Tax is regarded as an essential element in Georgism, it will remain as an irreconcilable
impediment to rapprochement.
21
“The Condition of Labour”, para. 10.
22
Ibid., para. 6; see also, paras. 9, 11, 24.
23
In this article, the term ‘land’ is used synonymously with ‘natural resources’ or ‘nature’s gifts’, and means all
materials not made by humans. The term ‘land value’ is used to mean the value of land in its natural, or
unimproved, or pre-improved state, calculated according to its current market value. The term ‘exogenous value’
is used as an alternative to ‘land value’ in order to stress that ‘land value’ refers to values arising from causes
extraneous to, or independently of, the titleholder of the land, and excludes values arising from the efforts or
investments of the titleholder. These exogenous causes would include growth of population, increased wealth of
the population, infrastructure improvements, environmental changes, town planning regulations, public works and
other government influences, and actions by persons other than the titleholder.
24
“The Condition of Labour”, para. 6.
25
Ibid., para. 8.
26
Ibid., para. 8.
27
Ibid., para. 16.
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particular portions can be legitimately converted into private ownership by means of
individual industry:
Now, when man thus spends the industry of his mind and the strength of his body in
procuring the gifts of nature, by that act he makes his own that portion of nature’s
field which he cultivates - that portion on which he leaves, as it were, the impress of
his own personality; and it cannot but be just that he should possess that portion as his
own, and should have a right to keep it without molestation.28… For the soil which is
tilled and cultivated with toil and skill utterly changes its condition; it was wild
before, it is now fruitful; it was barren, and now it brings forth in abundance.29
Leo here seems to have applied a labour-employed theory of ownership. The question of
whether the labour-employed theory of ownership as used by Leo was the same as the labouremployed theory of ownership presented by John Locke has been discussed by Anthony
Waterman. Leo’s version of the labour-employed theory of ownership has been described as
‘a pseudo-Lockean version’, as a ‘somewhat equivocal’ version of Locke’s theory,30 and as a
‘bowdlerized version of Locke’.31 Waterman adds: ‘if the property theory of Rerum Novarum
reveals the possible influence of Locke, it also displays considerable divergence both from
Locke’s intentions and from his conclusion’.32
Leo’s argument that, by working on a portion of nature’s field, an individual makes
that portion his own, leaves unanswered the question of why one particular individual should
have a right to begin work on a particular field, and to prevent another individual’s access to
that field. Also, the encyclical does not explain how a right of private ownership of a product
can exist without a prior right of ownership of the portion of nature’s gifts required to
produce the product.
As well as declaring that the right of private ownership is a natural right, Leo
described it as an inviolable right: ‘Our first and most fundamental principle, therefore, when
we undertake to alleviate the condition of the masses, must be the inviolability of private
property’.33 However, Leo also said that, in conjunction with this inviolable right, landowners
have social obligations34 toward non-landowners. The landowner has a duty to distribute to
others what is beyond ‘that which is required for his own necessities and those of his
household’, and beyond ‘what is reasonably required to keep up becomingly his condition in
life’; ‘it is a duty to give to the indigent out of that which is over’; ‘it is a duty, not of justice
(except in extreme cases) but of Christian charity’.35
Thus, it would seem that Leo intended the natural and inviolable right of private
ownership to be interpreted, not as an absolute and unconditional right, but rather as a right
that is limited and conditioned by the duty to distribute one’s excess wealth to the indigent.

28

Ibid., para. 9. This legitimisation of private ownership of land by means of industry is one of the most
controversial aspects of the encyclical.
29
Ibid., para. 10.
30
A. M. C. Waterman, “Property Rights in John Locke and in Christian Social Teaching”, Review of Social
Economy 40, no. 2 (1982): 98,105.
31
A. M. C. Waterman, “The Intellectual Context of Rerum Novarum”, Review of Social Economy 49, no. 4
(1991): 478.
32
Waterman, “Property Rights in John Locke and in Christian Social Teaching”, 105.
33
“The Condition of Labour”, para. 18.
34
Leo’s emphasis on the social obligations of landowners towards non-landowners has been outlined by Arnold
McKee (“The ‘Natural’ Right to Private Property”, Review of Social Economy 49, no. 4 (1991): 492).
35
“The Condition of Labour”, para. 24.
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V.

George’s arguments against private property.

George described private property in land as ‘immoral’,36 and accused Leo of ‘confusion of
thought’ in justifying private property in land as well as private property in things produced
by labour.37 He described Leo’s defence of private property in land as a defence of ‘one form
of slavery’.38 He believed that, in supporting private ownership of land, Leo was in fact
condoning and perpetuating social injustice. He claimed that private ownership of land is ‘a
gross injustice on the part of the state’; ‘a violation of natural right’; ‘an injustice that
amounts to robbery and murder’;39 and ‘a great social wrong’.40 He said that the state has a
moral duty to abolish private ownership of land and other natural resources.41
George believed that a right of private ownership, whether of natural resources or of
things produced by labour, is necessarily a right that is unqualified, unrestricted, and
absolute, and should be free of taxation: the state has no right to impose a tax on anything
that is privately owned. He therefore said that if land is privately owned, land taxation could
not be justified; but he argued that land taxation is justified because land is a natural resource
and should belong to everyone in common, and therefore the state has a right and a duty to
levy taxes on the value of land. The revenue derived from the land taxation should be
distributed throughout society, either equally or as equally as administratively possible.
George appears to have thought that the essence of private ownership of land consists
of private ownership of the exogenous value of the land, and that the removal by taxation of
private ownership of the exogenous value of land – and its absorption by the state –
constitutes a change of the essence of private ownership. He thought that a titleholder who
does not receive the exogenous value of the land cannot be regarded as the owner of the land.
However, George’s interpretation of the nature of private ownership of land is
questionable. He does not appear to have considered that the taxation of exogenous landvalue is merely an alteration of an accidental feature of private ownership, not an alteration of
the essence of private ownership; and that state intervention to deprive private ownership of
land of exogenous increments of value does not alter the private-ownership nature of land; it
does not nullify private ownership.
George could be criticised for not having given sufficient recognition to the
limitations placed by Leo on private ownership of land, and for not realising that Leo’s
concept of private ownership of land should be regarded as conditional ownership, rather than
absolute ownership. It has been argued by J. Brian Benestad that ‘Leo XIII’s position on the
ownership of property has more nuances than George’s letter reveals… Christians have an
obligation to use their property and talents for the good of others’;42 ‘George does not advert
to the limits Leo places on the use of property’, and ‘doesn’t point out the similarity between
“The Condition of Labour”, 23.
Ibid., 21-22.
38
Ibid., 28.
39
Ibid., 53.
40
Ibid., 87. George's statement that private ownership of land is ‘a gross injustice on the part of the state’ would
support the distinction elaborated (for example, by James Dawsey) between injustices committed by individuals,
and injustices perpetrated by society or by the state through its institution of, or its failure to rescind, a structure
of laws that unfairly affect the lives of individuals; or in theological terms, the distinction between individual sin
and structural sin. (Dawsey, “Human Nature from a Georgist Perspective”, American Journal of Economics and
Sociology 71, no. 4 (2012): 803). In George's view, laws that permit some individuals to have a more than equal
share of the exogenous value of natural resources would be a form of structural injustice.
41
Ibid., 53.
42
J. B. Benestad, “Henry George and the Catholic View of Morality and the Common Good, I: George’s
Overall Critique of Pope Leo XIII’s Classic Encyclical, ‘Rerum Novarum’”, American Journal of Economics
and Sociology 49, no. 3 (1985): 371-372.
36
37
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his position and Leo’s’.43 By drawing attention to Leo’s emphasis on the social duties of
landlords, and by showing that Leo’s concept of ownership was one of conditional, not of
absolute ownership as George alleged, Benestad has highlighted a serious deficiency in
George’s position, and has made a valuable contribution to the Leo-George debate and to the
possibility of rapprochement, but it does not close the gap completely. Leo’s insistence on
limits to the use of property, and on the social obligations of property owners, remains far
short of George’s denial of the right of individual ownership of land, but it reduces the degree
of difference between them.
VI.

Private ownership and private possession of land.

With regard to natural resources, there appears, at least at first sight, to be radical opposition,
with George saying that private ownership of land value is morally illegitimate, and that any
right to land can only be a right of possession, not a right of ownership; and Leo maintaining
not only the legitimacy of private ownership of land, but also its essentiality for human
progress. Leo did not make a formal distinction between private possession and private
ownership. He used ‘ownership’ and ‘possession’ interchangeably and synonymously - as,
for example, in the sentence ‘Every man has by nature the right to possess property as his
own’.44
George’s insistence that the right to land should be only a possessory right, not an
ownership right, is disputable. The main difference, in George’s perception, between private
possession of land and private ownership of land seems to centre on the right to the
exogenous value of land. He held that private ownership of land would give the owner a right
to the exogenous value of land, but that the exogenous value of land should belong to society.
But if the right of private ownership of land were to be defined in a way which includes the
liability of the titleholders to pay taxation on the value of the land, and acknowledges the
right of all members of the society to an equal share in the exogenous increments of the value
of the land, and also acknowledges that increments in the value of land accruing to the
titleholders are to be restricted to increments due to the efforts and investments of the
titleholders, then there is no logical reason for titleholders of natural resources not to be
described as private owners; the distinction that George sought to establish between private
ownership of land and private possession of land dissipates; there is no logical reason for
titleholders of natural resources not to be described as private owners. If George had not
adopted his idiosyncratic notion of private ownership, and had realised that the system of
tenure he called private possession was in fact a version private ownership, a major cause of
the difference between himself and Leo would have been removed.
In some of his Australian lectures45 in 1890 George was reported as saying that his
preferred system of land tenure involved the title system known as ‘fee simple’, with
increases in land value being reserved to the state.
VII.

Common ownership of nature’s gifts.

It is significant that Leo and George both recognised the justice of common ownership of
nature’s gifts. George stated: ‘to combine the advantages of private possession with the
justice of common ownership it is only necessary to take for common use what value attaches

J. B. Benestad, “A Catholic Response to Henry George’s Critique of Pope Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum”,
American Journal of Economics and Sociology 71, no. 4 (2012): 922.
44
“The Condition of Labour”, para. 6 (emphasis added).
45
See Pullen, Nature’s Gifts. Passim.
43
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to land irrespective of any labour on it’.46 Leo’s encyclical described the right of humans to
natural resources as a common right: ‘the blessings of nature and the gifts of grace belong in
common to the whole human race’.47 They both agreed that natural resources belong to
everyone, and that no one should be prevented, by force or law or conquest, from having
access to the benefits of natural resources.
But ‘common ownership’ can be interpreted either in a collective sense or in a
distributive sense. If common ownership of land is understood as distributively owned or
severally owned, each person in the society has a right of individual private ownership of
some portion of land. When common ownership of land is understood as jointly owned or
collectively owned, land belongs to the society as a whole or to its political head – the state or
the government. Such a socialistic or communistic interpretation of common ownership of
natural resources was rejected by both Leo and George. The distributive sense was explicitly
expressed by Leo; he argued that the right of common ownership of land is consistent with
the right of private ownership of particular portions of land. George explicitly rejected the
right of private ownership of particular portions of land, acknowledging only a right of
private possession of particular portions, but as argued in Section 5, a logical deconstruction
of his concept of private possession leads to the conclusion that in advocating what he called
‘private possession’ of land, he was in fact advocating private ownership – as that concept is
normally understood. If this deconstructed interpretation of George’s concept of private
possession of land is accepted, it would seem that, despite his assertions to the contrary, he
agreed with Leo on the principle of individual ownership of natural resources, as well as on
the principle of common ownership of natural resources.
VIII. Distribution of land between individual titleholders. Benefits for nontitleholders.
A major difference between Leo and George occurred on the question of the distribution or
sharing of land and other natural resources between titleholders (whether possessors or
owners) and non-titleholders – that is, the problem of who gets what, and on what terms, and
for how long. Although they agreed on the right of common ownership of nature’s gifts, they
differed on the means whereby the benefits of ownership of natural resources should be made
available to everyone, and on how the benefits that accrue in the first instance to owners of
natural resources should be distributed to those who do not have legal titles to individual
portions. Leo argued that if landowners recognised and complied with their social obligations
to non-landowners – as outlined in Section 3 above – some of the benefits that flow to
landowners from land ownership would be distributed more widely; non-landowners would
be able to enjoy the financial benefits of nature’s gifts, and would thus in effect receive the
access, in a financial sense, to which the right of common ownership entitles them. On the
question of how the land is to be ‘divided among private owners’, Leo asserted that ‘the
limits of private possession have been left to be fixed by man’s own industry and the laws of
individual peoples’.48 For Leo, the right of private ownership of nature’s gifts is based on
natural law, but the actual division of nature’s gifts is to be set by positive law, not natural
law. George regarded Leo’s views on the distribution of land among private owners as less
than satisfactory. He agreed with Leo that land was intended by God for mankind in general,
and no part was specifically assigned by God to any particular person. But he did not agree

“The Condition of Labour”, 8.
“The Condition of Labour”, para. 26.
48
Ibid., para. 8.
46
47
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that industry expended on land creates a right of ownership of the land. It gives a right of
ownership of the improvements made on the land, but not of ownership of the land itself.49
There was a crucial difference between Leo and George on the question of how the
land-poor or land-deprived would fare. Under George’s proposal, they would receive – by
right, not by charity – their equal share of the revenue from the taxation of land values. Under
Leo’s proposal, the extent to which the land-poor will benefit from nature’s gifts will depend
on landlords’ recognising and fulfilling their social duties as landlords, and on their
impartiality and beneficence.
George doubted whether the rights of non-landowners would be protected under
Leo’s proposal, because it places exaggerated and naive hopes on the morality of
landowners; it relies unrealistically on individual morality for the solution of a social or
institutional problem, and on the preparedness of landowners to accept and comply with the
Pope’s admonitions. George argued that the goodwill and charity of the landowners does not
excuse the social injustice of a maldistribution of the value of natural resources, and
beneficence is no substitute for justice.
Leo argued that privately-owned land does not benefit the landowner alone, but is also
of benefit to non-landowners and to members of society generally, even if landowners do not
fulfil properly their sharing obligations. Leo argued that ‘the earth, though divided among
private owners, ceases not thereby to minister to the needs of all; for there is no one who does
not live on what the land brings forth’, either by directly consuming the produce of land or by
paying for the produce of land by exchanging the produce of ‘some laborious industry’.50
In the final section of the encyclical, Leo states that the success of his proposal will
rest primarily, as a reviewer of this article has noted, on whether evangelisation of landlords
can lead to appropriate reforms in their attitude to their social duties. The difference between
Leo and George on this point might have arisen from a difference of opinion on human
perfectibility. Is human nature fallen and sinful, or are we humans capable of bettering our
condition as individuals and as a society with the help of evangelisation? But will
evangelisation be sufficient, or do we need also the support of a reform of the laws of
property rights in natural resources, or a combination of both measures? Are the two
approaches mutually exclusive, or can they be mutually supportive? Both approaches are
likely to experience implementation difficulties. Evangelisation of the landlords might be
neither rapid nor readily acceptable to them. Appeals to the ethical principle of equal rights to
land values, and the radical reformation of land laws to equalise the exogenous increases in
land value, as proposed by George, will surely encounter vigourous opposition from vested
interests and would not be readily incorporated into legislation.
In an outspoken rebuke, George said to Leo: your view that private ownership of land
is of benefit to non-landowners and that no one will suffer from private ownership of land, is
an ‘insult to your intelligence’.51
IX.

Equality in the ownership or possession of nature’s gifts.

Even if it can be established that Leo and George agreed on the right of individual private
ownership of nature’s gifts, there remains the question of whether the right should be an
equal right. Should nature’s gifts be shared equally by all the members of a nation, or society,
or the world? All have a right to own nature’s gifts, but is it an equal right?
Although there can be doubt about whether George’s tenure policy for nature’s gifts
was a tenure of private possession or a tenure of private ownership, there can be no doubt that
“The Condition of Labour”, 35-36.
“The Condition of Labour”, para. 8.
51
“The Condition of Labour”, 33.
49
50
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he advocated equality of tenure with respect to nature’s gifts: ‘The first and clearest of rights
is the equal right to the use of the physical basis of all life’.52
He believed that equality in the use of natural resources can be achieved not by
attempting the impossible task of dividing the natural resources into equal physical portions,
but by an equal sharing, through the disbursement of taxation revenue, of the exogenous
value accruing to natural resources. George thought that private ownership of natural
resources has always led, and will inevitably lead, to monstrous inequalities.
Leo also referred to the right to natural resources as an equal right (as well as a
common right): ‘man is commanded… to use all the earth and the ocean for his profit and
advantage… In this respect all men are equal’.53 But the equality alluded to here appears to
be an equal participation of everyone in the common right to all natural resources, rather than
to equal private portions of the value of natural resources. The encyclical does not assert that
the value of land and other natural resources that can be rightfully acquired by any one person
should be equal to the amount that can be rightfully acquired by any other person.
Is it possible that Leo’s reluctance or unwillingness to advocate equal rights of private
ownership of natural resources might have arisen from the fear that such a system would be
tantamount to socialism or communism, or that it implied a government-enforced equality of
incomes and standards of living? Would Leo’s reluctance have disappeared if George had
made it clearer, or if Leo had understood, that the equality being advocated by George
referred not to an impossibly equal physical sharing of land, but to equal financial shares in
the revenue generated by taxation of the exogenous increments in the value of natural
resources, and leaves unimpeded the freedom of each individual to exercise effort, enterprise
and skill, so that even if all have equal shares of the value of the natural resources, the
resulting standards of living could still be vastly different? It is a policy designed to
encourage a greater equality of inputs, rather than one that ensures greater equality of
outcomes.
Although Leo’s encyclical argued, as George also argued, for the general principle of
common ownership of natural resources, it did not support the principle of equal ownership
of the value of natural resources – which could be seen as the essential principle of Georgism,
even though George preferred to describe it is the equal possession of the value of natural
resources.
Although George advocated greater equality in the ownership of land and other
natural resources, he realised that absolute equality in that area would not be a feasible goal,
and might never be achievable, but he nevertheless insisted that efforts to attain that goal,
even if only approximately, and to attain the appropriate level of equality and the appropriate
level of inequality in the ownership and use of land and other natural resources, would result
in greater prosperity. The equality he sought did not involve a socialistic policy of state
ownership of land; it was a policy of private ownership of land, with an equal sharing of
exogenous increases in land value. His statement, often quoted by those who interpret him as
a socialist, ‘we must make land common property’, appears at first reading to be a policy of
socialist-type state ownership of land, but closer textual analysis shows that he wished to
maintain existing rights and titles to private ownership of land, including ‘fee simple’ rights,
but by taxation to transfer to community purposes the increases in land value that occur
extraneously to or independently of, the productive efforts of the titleholders. He insisted that
he was not a socialist, and he became separated from the Labor Party in New York because
he could not accept the socialistic aspects of its policy program.

52
53
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X. Transformation of common ownership into private ownership: substances and
accidents.
In arguing that labourers have a right of private ownership of their products even though the
raw materials required for their production are commonly owned, George made use of the
philosophical notions of substance and accident, or essence and attribute. He argued that
nature’s gifts are essentially the common property of all, but the works done by a human
agent in exploiting or developing nature’s gifts are accidents or attributes, which become
attached to the essence; and the combination of the substance and the accidents constitutes a
new being, which can be morally claimed as the private property of the human agent because
of the principle that human agents have a right of private ownership of their products:
Since the changes in which man’s production consists inhere in matter so long as they
persist, the right of ownership attaches the accident to the essence, and gives the right
of ownership in that natural material in which the labour of production is embodied.54
He supported this argument by the example of water being carried from a natural reservoir:
water is ‘the common gift of God to all men’, but when it is drawn from the natural reservoir,
it ‘passes rightfully into the ownership of the individual who by changing its place has
produced it there’.55
George does not explain how an accident that becomes attached to an essence can
overwhelm the essence to such an extent that the essence is transformed, and a new essence is
created in which the accident becomes the new essence and the old essence becomes an
accident. If, as George maintained, natural material is essentially common property, it is
difficult to see how this common-property essence is destroyed and changed into a privateproperty essence by the activity of an individual person who takes, uses, develops it, or
changes its location.
George could well be asked: If the labour employed in production can justify private
ownership of the product even though the natural resources used to make the product are in
common ownership, why cannot the same argument be used, as Leo used it, to justify private
ownership of natural resources on which labour has been employed? Both Leo and George
argue that the employment of labour provides a moral argument for transferring natural
resources from common ownership to private ownership, with the proviso in George’s case
that the exogenous increases in the value of natural resources be shared equally.
George’s metaphysics does not appear to weaken the logic of the argument that if
there is no right of private ownership of nature’s gifts, there can be no right of private
ownership of the products resulting from human work on nature’s gifts.
XI.

Conclusion

The views of Leo and George on the ownership of land and other natural resources seem at
first sight to be dialectically and irrevocably opposed; but an analysis of their respective
positions suggests that there could be scope for at least a partial rapprochement. Given that
Leo and George had so much in common, why and where exactly did they differ? The answer
is found at two levels: principles and policies. At the level of principles, they differed on the
equality issue. George insisted on the principle of equality of use or ownership of natural
resources. Leo did not explicitly oppose that principle, but did not explicitly support it. At the
54
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level of policies, George prescribed the collection (by taxation) of the exogenous value of
land, and a redistribution of the taxation revenue in a manner that benefits all, either equally,
or as equal as is administratively possible. Leo also believed in taxation revenue being used
for the equal benefit of all, but did not propose specific taxation of the exogenous value of
land.
Any reconciliation or rapprochement between Catholic Social Teaching and
Georgism would seem to be achievable only if several developments of principles and
policies were to occur:
1. if Catholic Social Teaching, instead of dismissing equal ownership of natural
resources as physically impossible and as an anti-social Communistic dream, were to
acknowledge that the principle of equal ownership of natural resources can be put into
practice by an equal sharing of increases in their current value.
2. if Catholic Social Teaching were to recognise that George’s program involves an
equal sharing of the exogenously-created value of natural resources – often
confusingly referred to as their unimproved value – not to the impossibly equal
sharing of the physical resources, and that the use and distribution of their exogenous
value should be equal, rather than merely common. Such a development would
remove a major difference and generate significant rapprochement.
3. if Georgism abandoned its distinction between private possession and private
ownership of natural resources, or, in other words, accepted that George’s concept of
private possession of land was, in effect, a concept of private ownership when that
concept is understood to include the right of the state to levy taxes on increases in the
exogenous value of land and other natural resources.
4. If Georgist taxation theory were to recognise the legitimacy of forms of taxation other
than land-value tax, and abandoned the policy of a Single Tax. George expressed
reservations or misgivings in his Australian lectures of 1890 about the appropriateness
of the term ‘Single Tax’ as a descriptor of his policy of land reform.
Developments (1) and (2) would not involve a reversal of Catholic Social Teaching.
Leo’s encyclical did not discuss and did not oppose the principle of an equal sharing of the
value of natural resources. Developments (3) and (4) are consistent with a neo-Georgist
interpretation, rather than a literal interpretation, of George’s writings, and would preserve
intact the fundamental principle and purpose of Georgism, namely, the equal sharing of land
and other natural resources.
George’s insistence on restricting the right to nature’s gifts to a right of possession
rather than a right of ownership, and Leo’s reluctance to advocate equality in the distribution
of the value of nature’s gifts, have served to alienate Georgism from Catholic Social
Teaching, and to prevent their making a combined attempt to improve ‘the condition of
labour.’
The commonality of Leo and George on the question of the ownership of land and
other natural resources should not be exaggerated, but should also not be ignored.
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